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National Identity and Ethnic Diversity
Paolo Masella
This Version: October 12, 2011
Abstract
In countries with high levels of ethnic diversity "nation building" has
been proposed as a mechanism for integration and conict reduction. This
paper examines the relationship between ethnic diversity and national
sentiment. We use individual data from the World Values Survey and,
contrary to conventional wisdom, we nd no evidence of lower intensity of
national sentiment in more ethnically fragmented countries or in minority
groups. National feelings in a minority can be higher or lower than in a
majority, depending on the degree of ethnic diversity of a country. On the
one hand, in countries with high ethnic diversity, nationalist feelings are
less strong in minority groups than in the majorities; on the other hand,
in countries with low ethnic diversity, the reverse is true.
Keywords: Identity, Ethnic Diversity, Nation-Building
JEL: A14, J15, Z10
1 Introduction
Recent empirical evidence suggests that ethnic diversity has a negative impact
on economic development and political stability. A high level of ethnic fraction-
alization is often associated with low levels of investment and worse institutional
quality; in countries with high levels of ethnic polarization the probability of
I am especially indebted to Francesco Caselli and Maitreesh Ghatak for their support.
I also thank three anonymous referees, the editor Klaus F. Zimmermann, Oriana Bandiera,
Erland Berg, Tim Besley, Matteo Cervellati, Raja Khali, Eliana La Ferrara, Andrea Prat and
participants at NEUDC conference 2006, "Polarization and Conict" conference 2006 and
seminars at LSE. All errors are mine. University of Mannheim, Economics Department and
SFB 884, L7, 3-5, 68131. Email: Paolo.Masella@mail.uni-mannheim.de.
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civil conict is higher.1 "Nation building" (policies that promote attachment to
nation over ethnic and regional identities) has been proposed as an integration
and conict reduction mechanism.2 Miguel (2004) documents the implementa-
tion of nation building reforms in the newly independent East African nations in
the 1960s and 1970s. He focuses on the economic development of two countries:
Tanzania and Kenya. Despite their similar colonial institutional legacy, ethnic
make up and geographical conditions, the leaders of these two countries have
adopted very di¤erent policies, especially with regard to ethnic groups, over
a wide range of dimensions. Nyerere (Tanzania) followed a Pan-Africanist
nation building policy and a centralized economic policy. Miguel (2004) shows
that nation-building allowed diverse communities in Tanzania to achieve better
economic outcomes than diverse communities in the Kenyan regions.
The aim of the present work is to investigate the main determinants of
national sentiment and, more importantly, the relationship between ethnic di-
versity and intensity of national feeling. Figures 1 and 2 cast some doubts on
the conventional views. They plot ethnic diversity (in Figure 1 we use the index
of ethnic fractionalization, in Figure 2 that of ethnic polarization)3 against the
level of national identication of each country.4 Figures 1 and 2 suggest the
absence of a negative relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and national
sentiment.
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 here]
We use data from the World Values Survey (WVS) and estimate the like-
lihood that an individual identies himself in national rather than in ethnic
terms. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we nd no evidence of less intense na-
tional sentiment in more ethnically fragmented countries or in minority groups.
However, we nd that national feelings in a minority are higher (lower) than in
a majority depending on the ethnic diversity of a country. On the one hand,
in more ethnically diverse countries, minorities show less intense national sen-
1Mauro (1995) claims that ethno-linguistic diversity has a direct negative e¤ect on the
level of investment. Easterly and Levine (1997) nd that a high level of ethnic fragmentation
has a negative impact on economic growth. Montalvo and Reynal (2005) suggest that ethnic
(and religious) polarization is one of the factors explaining economic development through its
impact on the probability of civil wars. For a more accurate survey of the literature on the
benets and the costs of diversity see Alesina and La Ferrara (2005).
2See, among others, Deutch and Foltz (1963) and Tilly (1975).
3The ethnic fractionalization index can be interpreted as measuring the probability that
two randomly selected individuals in a country belong to di¤erent ethnic groups.The purpose
of the ethnic polarization index is, instead, to capture how far the distribution of the ethnic
groups is from a bipolar distribution, which represents the highest level of polarization.
4National feeling at country level is measured as the proportion of individuals who choose
to identify with their nation rather than with their ethnic group.
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timent than majorities; on the other hand, in less diverse countries, the reverse
is true. We nd also that in larger groups national feelings are weaker and that
individuals with higher incomes are less likely to feel an association with their
ethnic group.
This paper is closely related to the growing literature on endogenous iden-
tity (see, among others, Akerlof and Kranton (2000), Bisin and Verdier (2000),
Bisin et al. (2006) and Caselli and Coleman (2006)). In particular, the paper is
connected to a recent literature that studies both the identity formation process
and how identity can a¤ect individual outcomes. Using the Afrobarometer sur-
veys for nine Sub-Saharan African democracies, Bannon et al. (2004) estimate
the likelihood that an individual identies him/herself in ethnic terms rather
than in terms of class or religion. They nd that the salience of ethnicity is neg-
atively related to ethnic diversity and claim that exposure to competition for
jobs and political power are factors that predispose individuals to identify them-
selves in ethnic terms. The present paper focuses instead on national identity
and attempts to study how the intensity of national sentiment di¤ers depending
on the characteristics of the ethnic group to which an individual belongs. Bisin
et al. (2008), Manning and Roy (2009) and Constant et al. (2008) explore
the importance of religion in shaping ethnic and national identity. Georgiadis
and Manning (2008) provide evidence supporting the view that multicultural
policies do indeed promote the integration and assimilation of immigrants in
the UK; Clots-Figueras and Masella (2010) investigate how governments can
inuence individual identity through the education curricula.5 Charness et al.
(2007) and Chen and Li (2009) conduct laboratory experiments to show how
group identity a¤ects individual behavior.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and
presents the empirical evidence. Section 3 discusses possible channels through
which ethnic composition can a¤ect the intensity of national feeling. Section 4
provides some concluding remarks.
5The relationship between education and identity is also explored by Aspachs et al. (2008).
They study how students in the Basque Countries sort into schooling systems based on par-
ents´ identity.
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2 Empirical evidence
2.1 Data
The data for this study come from the World Values Surveys (WVS) waves two
(1990-1993), three (1995-1997) and four (1998-2000). This is a multi-country
survey project that employs standardized questionnaires to investigate citizens
attitudes in a large set of countries.6 We focus especially on one of the questions
in the survey (here, we provide the US example):
"Which of the following best describes you? 1 above all, I am an Hispanic
American 2 above all, I am a Black American 3 above all, I am a White Amer-
ican 4 above all, I am an Asian American 5 I am an American rst and a
member of some ethnic group second"
We build a variable, "national identity", which is equal to 1 if individuals
answer "I am an American rst and a member of some ethnic group second",
and 0 otherwise. It is constructed from the 33,904 responses to the question from
individuals in 25 separate WVS rounds conducted in 21 countries: the United
States, Canada, Spain, China, Brazil, Byelorussia, Latvia, Uruguay, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Macedonia, Georgia, Albania, Bosnia, Indonesia, Israel, Moldova,
Bulgaria, Pakistan, Singapore and Jordan.
The World Values Survey involves face to face interviews where interviewers
code the respondentsethnic characteristics based on observation.7 We create
a variable "minority" which is equal to 0 if the ethnic group to which the in-
dividual belongs is the largest in the country, and 1 otherwise.8 We include
controls for individual income (each respondent is asked to choose from 10 in-
come categories, net of transfers and taxes), individual education ("primary" is
a dummy variable equal to 1 if primary is the highest level of education achieved
by the respondent) and individual occupation. Unfortunately, income is coded
di¤erently in the survey of Bulgaria and in the third wave of the survey conduc-
ted in Macedonia;9 in those two cases we code "income" as missing. In the main
6Li (2010) uses World Values data and minority-majority categorizations to study the
impact of social identities on tax attitudes.
7 In the case of Canada we use a question about the language spoken at home to further
distinguish between French Canadian and English Canadian.
8Jordan is an exception. The ruling ethnic group is the Jordanian group, which is actually
slightly smaller than the Palestinian group, a historically discriminated group. In this case
we classify Palestinian as the minority and Jordanian as the majority. The results are robust
to the exclusion of Jordan from the dataset, however.
9 In the case of Bulgaria there are 168 income categories rather than the standard 10; in
the case of Macedonia (wave III) there are 88 categories. In the fourth wave in Macedonia
income is coded in the standard way.
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specication we include income as a control, but we also report results without
income as control and, therefore, including Bulgaria and Macedonia (III wave)
in the sample. The survey asks individuals about their main occupation. They
are given 13 options to choose from. The omitted category is "agricultural
worker".
We also include characteristics of the ethnic groups and of the countries as
explanatory variables. The dataset in Fearon (2003) provides the size of the
ethnic groups in the sample.10 As a proxy of the average income of the group,
we use sample averages.
We include in our sample only those countries where there is perfect corres-
pondence between (i) the ethnic groups identied by Fearon in his dataset (ii)
the ethnic groups coded by the interviewer (iii) the ethnic groups included in
the "identity" question.11 To measure the ethnic diversity of a country we use
two indices: the index of ethnic fractionalization and that of ethnic polariza-
tion. The former is quite common in the literature, while the index of ethnic
polarization has been used only more recently.
The fractionalization index is dened as
Frac = 1 
NX
i=1
q2i
This indicator can be interpreted as measuring the probability that two
randomly selected individuals in a country will belong to di¤erent ethnic groups.
Therefore this index increases when the number of groups increases.
We also use the index RQ proposed by Reynal-Queirol
RQ = 4
NX
i=1
q2i (1  qi)
where qi is the size of the ethnic group i. The purpose of this index is to cap-
ture how far the distribution of the ethnic groups is from a bipolar distribution,
10Ethnic groups in Fearon´s dataset are identied sometimes in terms of language and
sometimes in terms of race. Although it would be interesting to separate the e¤ects of race
and language, the small size of the sample (number of countries included) does not allow this.
11For instance, we omit countries such as South Africa where there is a discrepancy between
the WVS and Fearon´s dataset. Fearon´s dataset codes 14 South African groups (Gname,
Zulu, Xhosa, North Sotho, Tswana, Coloured, Afrikaner, South Sotho, English-Speaking,
Tsonga, Swazi, Asian, Venda, Ndebele), the WVS only 4 groups (white, black, colored and
Indian), which makes it impossible to interpret the coe¢ cient of the interaction term between
the variable "minority" and the country level of diversity (this coe¢ cient is crucial for our
purposes as explained in the next section).
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which is the highest level of polarization.12
We use two weight variables provided by the survey. One is a national
weight, which reects the national distribution of key variables such as the
urban-rural divide, education, demographics and economic activity, while the
second variable assigns the same weight to every country in order to avoid
a large sample bias in the pooled country study. Table 1 reports the share of
respondents who identify themselves with their country for each of the 25 surveys
in our sample. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables used
in the analysis.13
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here]
2.2 Empirical strategy and results
2.2.1 Individual sources of national identication
We begin by regressing the variable "national identity" on a set of individual
characteristics. Standard errors are always clustered at the country-time level.
Column 1 of Table 3 reports our minimal specication. Respondents with higher
incomes are more likely to choose nation over ethnic group. Being part of a
minority group does not a¤ect individual identity. Column 2 introduces age
dummies and Column 3 includes country-year xed e¤ects. Column 4 includes
controls for individual´s occupation and education. The coe¢ cient of the vari-
able "primary" is negative and signicant. This suggests that less educated
respondents (with at most primary education) display weaker national feelings
than better educated respondents.14 However, the coe¢ cient is not very large.
An individual educated to higher than primary level is (almost) 3 per cent
more likely to identify himself with the nation than an individual with, at most,
primary level education. It turns out that individual identity does not vary
very strongly with occupation (the omitted category is "agricultural worker").
Individuals belonging to categories such as "professional" (teachers, lawyer...),
"farmer" and to some extent "foreman" are more likely to be identied with
the nation than "agricultural workers". The coe¢ cient of "minority" is never
signicant in any of the four specications, while the coe¢ cient of income is
always positive and signicant.
[Insert Table 3 here]
12See Montalvo and Reynal (2005) for a detailed discussion.
13Descriptive statistics refer to the sample excluding Bulgaria and Macedonia (III wave).
14Similar ndings are reported by Dustmann (1996). He nds that the level of education is
positively correlated with the degree of assimilation of immigrants.
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2.2.2 National identity and ethnic diversity
As a further step, we check if there is a relationship between identication and
ethnic diversity. We regress identity on the set of individual controls included in
our minimal specication (Table 3, Column 1), GDP per capita and ethnic di-
versity (in Table 4, Column 1 uses the index of ethnic fractionalization, Column
3 that of ethnic polarization). Columns 2 and 4 of Table 4 exclude "income"
from the set of controls, therefore including Bulgaria and Macedonia (III wave)
for the reasons discussed in Section 2.1. We nd no evidence of a negative rela-
tionship between ethnic diversity and national identity; the results in the table
show instead weak evidence of a positive relationship. However, the size of the
sample is limited and the countries included in our study may not be a good
substitute for a world-wide sample.
We turn now to the main specication. In the previous section, we show
that the coe¢ cient of the variable minority is not signicant. Respondents from
minority groups do not tend to be more or less identied with their nation
than respondents from majority groups. In this section, we study whether the
feelings of respondents from minority groups are inuenced by the degree of
ethnic diversity of the country in which they live. We introduce an interaction
term between the variable "minority" and a country variable that measures
ethnic diversity.
The specication of the pooled cross-country analysis is given by:
national identity i;c;t = c;t + incomei;c;t +minorityi;c;t +
+minorityi;c;t  ethnic diversityc + "i;c;t
There are country-time xed e¤ects, which means that omitted country char-
acteristics, correlated with ethnic polarization, are not a¤ecting individual iden-
tity. However, there can be omitted country level variables having di¤erential
impacts on individual identity and correlated with right hand side variables
(ethnic diversity in this case).
In Table 4, Columns 5 and 6 use the index of ethnic fractionalization,
Columns 7 and 8 that of ethnic polarization; Columns 5 and 7 include in-
come among the controls. We briey describe the results reported in Table 4,
Columns 5 to 8. The coe¢ cient of the variable minority is positive while the
sign of the coe¢ cient of the interaction term is negative. Both coe¢ cients are
signicant. In countries with average ethnic polarization, the identity choices
of minority and that of the majority groups are no di¤erent. However, if we
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increase the ethnic polarization index by one standard deviation, we nd that
individuals from ethnic minority groups are 10 percentage points less likely to
identify with nation than those from the majority group, while if we decrease
the ethnic polarization index by one standard deviation, we nd that individu-
als from ethnic minority groups are 10 percentage points more likely to identify
with nation than those from the majority group.15
[Insert Table 4 here]
Table 5 reports the results of several exercises performed to check the valid-
ity of the ndings in Table 4, Columns 5-8. All the specications include income
among the control variables. In Row 1 the most fractionalized country in the
sample is excluded, in Row 2 the least fractionalized country is excluded; in Row
3 the most polarized country is excluded, in Row 4 the least polarized country
is excluded. In order to control for the possibility that we are capturing the
e¤ect of omitted country-variables (correlated with diversity) having di¤eren-
tial impacts on individual identity, in Rows 5 and 6 our specications include
an interaction term between the variable "minority" and per capita GDP. In
all six specications the coe¢ cient of the variable "minority" is positive and
signicant and the coe¢ cient of the interaction term between ethnic diversity
and "minority" is negative and signicant.
[Insert Table 5 here]
2.2.3 Size of the ethnic group
Through a second set of regressions we study the relationship between national
identity and the size of the ethnic group to which the individual belongs. In all
the specications income is included as one of the control variables. We divide
the sample in two subsamples: one that includes only individuals belonging to a
minority group and one that includes only individuals belonging to the majority
group. We regress identity on the usual set of individual characteristics and on
the size of the group to which the respondent belongs. Table 6, Columns 2 and
5 include the sample mean income for each ethnic group. We can only include
country xed e¤ects when we use the subsample including only individuals from
minority groups. The coe¢ cient of the variable measuring the size of the ethnic
group to which the respondent belongs is always negative and signicant. As
before, no causality can be claimed; omitted group characteristics (and country
characteristics when country xed e¤ects are not included), correlated with the
15The results reported in Table 4 are robust to the exclusion from the dataset of the 3
countries (Bosnia, Indonesia and Jordan) where the ethnic majority represents less than 50%
of the population.
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size of the group, may a¤ect individual identity.
[Insert Table 6 here]
2.3 Measurement issues and other concerns
There are several limitations to our analysis. First, respondentsanswers are
context specic. We try to control for this by using what we know about the
survey context (particularly where and when the survey was conducted). How-
ever, there are aspects for which we cannot control, such as the proximity of
ethnic festivals.
Secondly, there may be measurement errors, which are particularly import-
ant in attitude surveys. Respondents from societies where social norms prevent
any open talk about ethnicity may be less likely to declare ethnic identica-
tion.16 In countries where ethnicity is dened by race, increased awareness of
racism might a¤ect the willingness of a white person to say "I am rst and
foremost white" and make them more likely to identify with the nation, which
might induce an upward bias on measured national identity. However, the ques-
tion analyzed is only one out of 220 questions in the standard World Values
Survey, and the only one that refers explicitly to ethnicity. Also, the inclusion
of country xed e¤ects partly deals with this concern.
Thirdly, it is not clear whether the countries in our study are a good sub-
stitute for a world-wide sample. Our ndings should be interpreted with the
caveat that they may not be representative of the whole world.
We found that income is positively correlated with the likelihood that an
individual identies him/herself in national rather than ethnic terms. The size of
the group is negatively correlated with the intensity of national feelings. Those
relationships, however, cannot be claimed to be causal since omitted variables
correlated with size or income may a¤ect national identity. In the case of the
main specication, the inclusion of country xed e¤ects moderates the omitted
variables problem. However, there may still be omitted country-variables that
have di¤erential impacts on individual identity and which are correlated with
the right hand side variables (ethnic diversity in this case).
16The survey was conducted by interviewers who were not a¢ liated to any political party
or government, making it likely that the survey was not perceived as related to a national
institution.
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3 Discussion of the Channels
In this section we discuss the channels through which a country´s ethnic make-
up might a¤ect the strength of national feeling.
In very diverse societies there is likely to be more economic, political and
cultural discrimination towards minorities, which may be directly detrimental
to the degree of integration of minorities or indirectly through the reduction
of their income and economic opportunities.17 This could explain why, in very
diverse societies, individuals from minorities groups tend to be less nationalistic
than individuals from majorities.18
A governance outcome commonly associated with severely divided societies
is patronage. Patronage refers to the system of granting benets to members of
a particular ethnic group (the one in power) while discriminating against other
ethnic groups. Examples of groups advantaged by their political leaders are the
Northern groups in Nigeria and Uganda, and the Tutsis in Burundi. Alesina,
Baqir and Easterly (1998) provide more formal evidence showing that public
employment is signicantly higher in US cities where ethnic fragmentation is
higher. They interpret public employment as a subsidy to ethnically dened
interest groups.
There is substantial evidence also that discrimination reduces cultural integ-
ration and the establishment of national identity among minorities. Using data
from the 2007 UK Citizenship Survey, Georgiadis and Manning (2009) nd that
members of minority groups who feel well treated tend to identify more strongly
with the UK, while those, who perceive to be treated badly by a variety of pub-
lic sector organizations or who feel that their ethnic groups are discriminated
against by British society, tend to report weaker national feelings.19 Bisin et
al. (2008) using a di¤erent data source (UK Fourth National Survey of Ethnic
Minorities) obtained similar ndings; in the UK, episodes of harassment and
discrimination in the work place for reasons of race or color, or religious or
cultural beliefs seem to be strongly positively correlated with the intensity of
religious feeling among minorities. Discrimination and negative public attitudes
are reported as the most important barriers to the integration of immigrants
and minorities by Constant et al. (2009) based on their analysis of the new IZA
17This is consistent with the positive association found between income and national feeling.
18Krueger and Pischke (1997) and Dustmann and Preston (2001) suggest that it is likely that
high concentrations of ethnic minorities promoted more hostile attitudes against minorities in
Germany and England.
19Bauer et al. (2000) suggest that attitudes of the native population towards immigration
is likely to be related to whether immigrants are selected according to the needs of the labor
markets.
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Expert Opinion Survey conducted in 2007 among expert stakeholders in the EU-
27. Using data from the Afrobarometer, Bannon et al. (2004) nd that race
is most salient in countries with recent histories of racial discrimination (South
Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia). Conicts between cultures, however, are not
inevitable; multicultural policies might improve the level of assimilation of im-
migrants and minorities. Citizenship rights are correlated with national feelings
in the UK (Manning and Roy, 2009) and the US; Avitabile et al. (2010) analyze
a provision of the 2000 German nationality reform and show that introducing
elements of birthright citizenship in Germany increased the level of integration
of immigrants measured by their propensity to engage in social contacts with
Germans and to use the German language.
As discussed above, the results in Table 4 imply that in countries with low
ethnic diversity individuals from minorities tend to show stronger national sen-
timent than individuals from majorities. This might be explained by a direct
negative e¤ect of group size on the intensity of national identity. Each ethnic
group has its own social norms20 and deviations from them might involve some
psychological costs.21 It might be that in order to overcome the shocks related
to the distance from a particular ethnic group, an individual develops stronger
national feeling. In other words, nationalist sentiment may represent a form
of compensation for the abandonment of the ethnic convention. These costs
are likely to be higher the more widespread the norm in the population (and
the larger the ethnic group). Then, individuals from smaller ethnic groups will
deviate more often from their groups´ norms and will develop stronger national
feelings.22 This is in line with the assumption used to construct the polarization
index that identication with ones own group is a positive function of its size23
and, more importantly, is conrmed by the results in Table 6. Group size seems
to be negatively associated with the probability that respondents choose nation
over ethnic identity.
20Members of an ethnic group might be expected to consume a specic ethnic good as
dened by Chiswick (2009), respect a specic dress code (e.g. the Islamic veil) or a particular
diet, as discussed by Epstein (2006). Norms can involve the use of the local language at home
(Lazear, 1999) or participation in rituals and festivals (Kuran, 1998).
21This is consistent with a broad class of conformity models (see, among others, Akerlof,
1980 and Kandel and Lazear, 1992).
22Similar assumptions are made by Bisin et al. (2006) and Akerlof (1980). Kandel and
Lazear (1992) discuss the relationship between rm size and peer pressure; they suggest that
the level of monitoring may increase with the size of the rm and also that, if more workers
observe an individual, the sanctions imposed might be greater.
23See Esteban and Ray (1994).
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4 Conclusions
This paper investigated the relationship between ethnic diversity and individual
identity. Using data from the World Values Surveys, we provide several empir-
ical facts. There is no evidence of a lower intensity of national sentiment in
more ethnically fragmented countries or in minority groups. National feelings
in a minority can be higher or lower than in a majority, depending on the degree
of ethnic diversity of the country. On the one hand, in very ethnically diverse
countries, minorities have weaker national sentiments than majorities; on the
other hand, in countries with low ethnic diversity, the reverse is true.
It is commonly believed that creation of a shared identity among the cit-
izens of a country might be benecial from an economic point view. There is
substantial evidence that more pro-social behavior is observed among groups of
individuals who perceive themselves as sharing the same culture and identity.
This is likely to be important in countries with high levels of diversity since
empirical studies show the existence of a strong negative correlation between
ethnic diversity and both economic development and political stability. One
of the aims of this paper was to identify which countries should pursue more
aggressive nation building programs and whether there are certain groups that
should be targeted. Minority groups in ethnically diverse countries and major-
ity groups in homogeneous societies seem to show weaker intensity of national
identity. In heterogeneous societies, where economic outcomes are worse, our
ndings seem to suggest the need for policies that are able to stimulate feelings
of national identity among minorities, such as the enforcement of a common
language for education and administration in countries where ethnic groups
tend to be di¤erentiated along language lines (this applied to Tanzania in the
mid-1960s; for an extensive discussion see Miguel (2004)).
5 Data Appendix
5.1 Denition of variables
-National identity: dummy equal to 1, if the respondent says "I am an American
rst and a member of some ethnic group second" (US example). Source: WVS
-Minority: dummy equal to 0, if the ethnic group to which the individual
belongs is the largest in the country; otherwise it is equal to 1. Each interviewer
has been asked to code the ethnic group of each individual in the sample. Source:
WVS
-Age: age of the respondent. Source: WVS
12
-Female: dummy equal to 1, if the respondent is female. Source: WVS
-Primary: dummy equal to 1, if the respondent has, at most, primary school
education. Source: WVS
-Married: dummy equal to 1, if respondent is married. Source: WVS
-Income: Proxy for individual income stream (not disposable). There are 10
income categories (net of transfers and taxes); they have been coded by deciles
for each country, 1=lowest decile; 10=highest decile. Source: WVS
-Employer>10: dummy equal to 1, if the respondent is employer/manager
of an establishment with 10 or more employees. Source: WVS
-Employer<10: dummy equal to 1, if the respondent is employer/manager
of an establishment with less than10 employees. Source: WVS
-Professional: dummy equal to 1, if the respondent is a professional worker,
lawyer, accountant, teacher, etc Source: WVS
-Supervisor: dummy equal to 1, if the respondent is a supervisory, non-
manual o¢ ce worker Source: WVS
-O¢ ce: dummy equal to 1, if the respondent is a non-supervisory, non-
manual o¢ ce worker. Source: WVS
-Foreman: dummy equal to 1, if the respondent is a foreman and supervisor
Source: WVS
-Skilled: dummy equal to 1, if the respondent is a skilled manual worker
Source: WVS
-Semi-skilled: dummy equal to 1, if the respondent is a semi-skilled manual
worker Source: WVS
-Unskilled: dummy equal to 1, if the respondent is an unskilled manual
worker Source: WVS
-Farmer: dummy equal to 1, if the respondent has his/her farm Source:
WVS
-Armed forces: dummy equal to 1, if the respondent is a member of armed
forces. Source: WVS
-Never job: dummy equal to 1, if the respondent never had a job Source:
WVS
-Size: size of ethnic group to which the individual belongs. Source: Fearons
dataset
-Etfra: country index of ethnic fractionalization. Source: Fearons dataset
-Etpol: country index of ethnic polarization. Source: Fearons dataset
13
5.2 Countries and ethnic groups
Albania (wave IV): Albanian, Greek, other; Armenia (wave III): Armenian,
Russian, other; Azerbaijan (wave III): Azerbaijanian, Russian, other; Belarus
(wave III): Belarusian, Russian, Polish, Ukranian, other; Bosnia (waveIV): Bos-
niak, Serbs, Croats, other; Brazil (wave III): white, mulatto, black, other; Bul-
garia (wave III): Bulgarian, roma, Turkish, other; Canada (wave IV): English
Canadian, French Canadian, black, South Asian, Chinese, East Asian, indigen-
ous peoples, other; China (wave II): Han, other; Georgia (wave III): Geor-
gian, other; Indonesia (wave IV): Javanese, Malay, Chinese, Sundanese, other;
Israele (wave IV): Jewish, Arabic; Jordan (wave IV): Jordanian, Palestinian,
other; Latvia (wave III): Latvian, Russian, Belarusian, Ukrainian, Polish, other;
Macedonia (waves III-IV): Macedonian, Albanian, Turkish, roma, Serb, other;
Moldova (wave III): Moldovian, Slavs, Bulgarian, Gaugas; Pakistan (wave
IV): Punjabi, Baluchi, Sindhi, Urdu speaking, other; Singapore (wave IV):
Malay, Indian, south Asian, Chinese, other; Spain (waves III-IV): Castillano,
Catalan, Basque, Galician, other; Uruguay (waveIV): white, black, other; US
(waves II-III-IV): white, black, Asian, Hispanic, other;
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Figure 1: National Identity and Ethnic Fractionalization
Note: Country level National Identity is measured as the fraction of individuals in each country
that chooses to identify with the nation rather then with its ethnic group.
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Figure 2:  National Identity and Ethnic Polarization
Note: Country level National Identity is measured as the fraction of individuals in each country that
chooses to identify with the nation rather then with its ethnic group.
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National Identity National Identity
Albania (w. IV) 0,015 Latvia (w. III) 0,4077
Armenia (w. III) 0,0444 Macedonia (w. III) 0,0145
Azerbaijan (w.III) 0,0501 Macedonia (w. IV) 0,1655
Belarus (w. III) 0,3459 Moldova (w. III) 0,1726
Bosnia (w.IV) 0,3837 Pakistan (w. IV) 0,7835
Brazil (w. III) 0,4599 Singapore (w. IV) 0,2929
Bulgaria (w.III) 0,0541 Spain (w. IV) 0,3075
Canada (w. IV) 0,5288 Spain (w. III) 0,3424
China (w. II) 0,0454 Uruguay (w.IV) 0,7906
Georgia (w.III) 0,1633 US (w. IV) 0,3912
Indonesia (w. IV) 0,524 US (w. III) 0,3025
Israele (w.IV) 0,7835 US (w. II) 0,2752
Jordan (w.IV) 0,1427
Mean St. dev. obs
Age 41 16,39 32424
Female 0,51 0,49 32457
Married 0,57 0,49 32484
Income 4,41 2,36 29673
manager>10 0.02 0.16 30460
manager<10 0.04 0.2 30460
professional 0.13 0.34 30460
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Table 1: National identity by country
Note: Country level National Identity is measured as the fraction of individuals in each country that chooses to identify with
the nation rather than with its ethnic group.
supervisor 0.06 0.24 30460
nonmanual 0.09 0.28 30460
foreman 0.03 0.18 30460
skilled 0.17 0.37 30460
semiskilled 0.07 0.26 30460
unskilled 0.09 0.28 30460
farmer .02 0.15 30460
armed forces 0.01 0.13 30460
never worked 0.17 0.38 30460
primary 0.23 0.42 29636
Av. group income 4,49 1,2 95
minority 0,25 0,43 32498
etfra 0,44 0,17 23
size 0,23 0,28 95
etpol 0,63 0,21 23
national identity 0,32 0,46 32087
Note: The table reports the mean values of variables in the sample with
standard deviations in parentheses. The Descriptive Statistics refer to the
sample without Bulgaria and Macedonia (III wave). See the text and the
Data Appendix for details and definitions.
Table 3  Sources of national identification: individual characteristics
  national identity 
Age 0.002**
(0.00)
Female 0.004  0.002  -0.003  -0.003
(0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009)
married -0.041* -0.06** 0.005 0.002
(0.23) (0.023) (0.009) (0.01)
 income 0.02*** 0.019*** 0.007* 0.005*
(0.06) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003)
minority 0.003 0.001 -0.049 -0.052
(0.06) (0.06) (-0.048) (-0.048)
primary(at most) -0.029*
(0.016)
man>10  0.002
(0.027)
man<10 0.03
(0.029)
professional 0.055**
(0.024)
supervisor 0.004
(0.022)
nonmanual  0.002
(0.021)
foreman 0.04*
(0.021)
skilled 0.004
(0.019)
semiskilled 0.004
(0.015)
unskilled 0.006
(0.023)
farmer 0.045**
(0.018)
armforc 0.036
(0.025)
neverworked 0.008
(0.02)
Age f.e. no yes yes yes
country-time f.e. no no yes yes
observations 29230 29230 29230 25132
country-time obs 23 23 23 20
R squared 0,015 0,022 0,217 0,229
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the respondent identifies with the
nation rather than the ethnic group. Minority is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the
individual belongs to a minority group. The variable primary is a dummy equal to 1 if the
respondent has a low level of education (at most primary). Income is our proxy for the
individual´s income stream. Column 4 includes controls for respondent´s profession. The US (II
wave) and China samples do not provide information on respondent´s education; the Israel
sample does not provide information on respondent´s profession. Standard errors clustered at
country-time level are reported in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***
significant at 1%.
income 0.014** 0.019*** 0 .007* 0 .007*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
minority -0.059 -0.062 -0.036 -0.04 0.344** 0.349** 0.328* 0.382**
National identity
Table 4   Sources of national identification: Diversity
(-0.051) (0.048) (-0.05) (0.049) (0.144) (0.137) (0.165) (0.149)
etfra 0.55** 0.579**
(0.254) (0.243)
etfra*minority -0.765** -0.779**
(0.304) (0.298)
etpol 0.357* 0.364*
(0.208) (0.192)
etpol*minority -0.531** -0.607**
(0.254) (0.236)
observations 29230 33904 29230 33904 29230 33904 29230 33904
country*time F.E. no no no no yes yes yes yes
country*time obs 23 25 23 25 23 25 23 25
R squared 0.06 0.049 0.045 0.0318 0.221 0.236 0.218 0.234
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the respondent identifies with the nation rather than the ethnic group. Minority is a dummy variable that is equal to 1
if the individual belongs to a minority group. The variables etfra and etpol represent the level of ethnic fractionalization and polarization in the country of residence of the
respondent. Income is our proxy for the individual´s income stream. In Columns 1-4 we include per capita GDP (at the time of the survey) as a control variable. All specifications
control for gender, marital status and age (linearly). Standard errors clustered at the country-time level are reported between parentheses. *Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%,
*** significant at 1%.
minority etfra*minority etpol*minority
Row 1 Most Fract. 0.454***  -1.014***
excluded (0.152) (0.352)
Table 5   Sources of national identification: Diversity (Robustness) 
Row 2 Least Fract. 0.33** -0.74**
excluded (0.151) (0.316)
Row 3 Most Pol. 0.328* -0.531**
excluded (0.165) (0.254)
Row 4 Least Pol. 0.36* -0.582*
excluded (0.205) (0.331)
Row 5 GDP*minority 0.486*** -0.825***
(0.131) (0.257)
Row 6 GDP*minority 0.417** -0.514**
(0.155) (0.229)
Note: The variables etfra and etpol represent the level of ethnic fractionalization and polarization in the country of
residence of the respondent. Specifications in Rows 1, 2 and 5 use the specification in Table 4, Column 5 as a
benchmark. Row 1 excludes the most fractionalized country, Row 2 excludes the least fractionalized, Row 5 includes
an interaction term between per capita GDP and the variable "minority". Specifications in Rows 3, 4 and 6 use the
Specification of Column 7 of Table 4 as a benchmark. Row 1 excludes the most polarized country, Row 2 excludes
the least polarized, Row 6 includes an interaction term between per capita GDP and the variable "minority" .
av.group inc. 0.065 0.069*
(0.041) (0.35)
size -0.674* -0.669** -0.695*** -0.765** -0.637**
Table 6:    Sources of national identification: size of the group  
National identity
(0.33) (0.32) (0.145) (0.304) (0.283)
country*time F.E. no no no yes yes
country*time obs 23 23 23 23 23
total obs. 21479 23523 7600 7600 7600
Sample only maj only maj only min only min only min
R squared 0.063 0.079 0.066 0.18 0.183
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the respondent identifies with the nation rather than the
ethnic group. The variable size measures the size of the ethnic group to which the respondent belongs to. Average
group income measures the sample average of the incomes of the components of the ethnic group to which the
respondent belongs. Specifications 1-2 include only respondents belonging to the majority group in the country of
residence. Specifications 3, 4 and 5 include only respondents who do not belong to the majority group in the country
of residence. All specifications control for individual income, gender, marital status and age (linearly). Standard errors
clustered at group level are reported in parentheses. *Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
